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Abstract. The culturally and ecologically diverse region of the Eastern Himalayas is the target of ambitious
hydropower development plans. Policy discourses at national and international levels position this development
as synergistically positive: it combines the production of clean energy to fuel economic growth at regional and
national levels with initiatives to lift poor mountain communities out of poverty. Different from hydropower
development in the 20th century in which development agencies and banks were important players, contemporary
initiatives importantly rely on the involvement of private actors, with a prominent role of the private finance
sector. This implies that hydropower development is not only financially viable but also understood as highly
profitable. This paper examines the new development of hydropower in the Eastern Himalayas of Nepal and
India. It questions its framing as green energy, interrogates its links with climate change, and examines its
potential for investment and capital accumulation. To do this, we also review the evidence on the extent to
which its construction and operation may modify existing hydrogeological processes and ecosystems, as well
as its impacts on the livelihoods of diverse groups of people that depend on these. The paper concludes that
hydropower development in the region is characterized by inherent contentions and uncertainties, refuting the
idea that dams constitute development projects whose impacts can be simply predicted, controlled and mitigated.
Indeed, in a highly complex geological, ecological, cultural and political context that is widely regarded to be
especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, hydropower as a development strategy makes for a toxic
cocktail.
1 Introduction
Often called the Water Towers of Asia, the Himalayan region
represents both the connection and collision of two processes
emblematic for the early 21st century. The first is the surge of
interest for hydropower development. While different figures
abound, near to 200 new dams are planned in the Himalayas
for the generation of more than 150 000 MW1 of electricity
1Exact data of how much is planned that is specific for the East-
ern Himalayan region and up to date in 2014 are not available, as
(Dharmadhikary, 2008; Pomeranz, 2009; IR, 2014). The sec-
ond is the recognition of, and debate over, climate change.
Although data are limited and contested, there is significant
scientific consensus that the Himalayas are particularly vul-
nerable to the effects of global climate change. How the ef-
fects of hydropower development will intersect with the im-
pacts of climate change is a source of serious concern as the
inflexibility of hydropower construction is incongruent with
projects are planned, cancelled, under revision, etc. Furthermore,
exact data on Chinese activities were not accessible.
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Figure 1. Hydropower development in the Teesta River basin, Sikkim.
growing insights on climate variability. First estimates sug-
gest that increased uncertainties of river flows (Shah, 2013)
may render baseline data used for infrastructure design un-
reliable, suggesting that climate change will exacerbate the
impacts of hydropower in altering river flows and the hydro-
logical variability of springs (Bawa et al., 2010; Dharmad-
hikary, 2008; Moore et al., 2010), especially when several
installations are constructed in sequence on the same river
(see for example Fig. 1).
Paradoxically, climate change awareness has increased the
popularity of hydropower2, now presented as renewable and
clean energy that can replace fossil fuels as well as fulfil
growing energy demands in Asia and elsewhere. As such,
2In a similar fashion nuclear power has once again become more
popular as a source of energy with low GHG emissions.
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hydropower projects qualify for top-up funding through the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). They comprise the
second largest type of project receiving CDM financing
(Mäkinen and Khan, 2010). China and India, respectively,
make up the bulk of CDM financed projects in Asia, account-
ing for 45 per cent of the projects and 65 % of the total in-
vestment (UN, 2012). Most of these investments are for hy-
dropower projects planned and located in the Himalayan re-
gion.
At national and regional levels, hydropower development
is pursued not so much as a climate change mitigation strat-
egy, but as a way to meet objectives of economic growth and
energy demand of downstream industries, cities and com-
mercial farmers (Asif and Muneer, 2007; Marslen, 20143).
Regardless of the objectives, hydropower is popularly pre-
sented as an economically beneficial certainty, even though
there is a systematic absence of empirical evidence on how
dams affect poverty and livelihoods (Dufflo and Pande, 2007)
and whether potential benefits outweigh the social and en-
vironment costs incurred (Ansar et al., 2014). Hydropower
projects present opportunities for economies that seek much-
needed foreign exchange as in the case of Nepal and Bhutan,
and allow others to become power brokers in the region, as
in the case of India and China. The emphasis given to hy-
dropower development during the first official visits of the
recently elected Prime Minister of India to Bhutan and Nepal
are telling in this regard. Different from hydropower devel-
opment in the 20th century when international financial insti-
tutions (IFIs) played an important role, current hydropower
dynamics include a wide range of global and regional fi-
nanciers, due to the deregulation of the energy sector and
processes of global financialization. Rather than being con-
cerned with either climate change or regional or national de-
velopment, these new players see hydropower development
as investment opportunity and are primarily interested in po-
tential returns. For example, more than 70 leading commer-
cial banks and financial institutions have adopted the Equator
Principles, a project of the World Bank’s International Fi-
nance Corporation (IFC) to guide finance investments in the
hydropower sector. It is assumed that guiding infrastructure
investments to meet the IFC’s Performance Standards will
improve their environmental and social risk management.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is said to be enhanced
by a number of such protocols that when signed can facilitate
access to projects; however, lack of transparency and corrup-
tion often overshadow good intentions (see Middelton, 2009;
Wright, 2012; Merme et al., 2014).
The current enthusiasm for hydropower development, and
the strong alliances that support it, suggest that the contro-
versies that among others led to the World Commission on
Dams have either disappeared or can now be dealt with more
effectively. But is there reason to expect that the current
3http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/sap/FDI_
StrategicAnalysisPaper_-NepalHydropower_andGeopolitics.pdf
resurgence, fuelled by claims of renewable energy to miti-
gate climate change, will cause less controversy, problems
and damage? In this paper, we examine this for the East-
ern Himalayan region of Nepal and North Bengal in India4.
This is a region that is not only geologically and ecologi-
cally unique, but also politically fragile, with ethnic and cul-
tural tensions and faults corresponding to the region’s inter-
national and national boundaries. Furthermore, the seismic
activity in the region makes it disproportionally precarious
and adds a particular urgency to questions about the kind of
development that can best be pursued and where, who will
benefit, and who will bear the costs. Our purpose is here is
not to argue against hydropower per se, but rather to stimulate
and broaden the discussion of it by inviting other stakehold-
ers and disciplines to contribute, in order to determine more
precisely and more interdisciplinarily the dynamics that are
inherent in hydropower development.
Hydropower development demonstrates the complex syn-
ergies and tensions that climate change provokes. Our ana-
lytical frame regards the hydraulic structures built to produce
hydropower as active agents of change in landscapes that are
produced by the interaction of social, biophysical and tech-
nological dynamics (Ahlers, 2011; Bury et al., 2013; Mee-
han, 2013). Changes produced are not only material but also
semiotic: discourses that recycle hydropower as clean energy,
warn of imminent climate risks and use economic develop-
ment to justify and enact far-reaching modifications that re-
configure territory by redirecting flows and sediments, and
along with it reorder its organization institutionally, politi-
cally, economically. These waterscapes, in turn, can be read
as historical outcomes of contestations over the meaning and
direction of development (Ahlers et al., 2014; Budds and Hi-
nojosa, 2012; Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Zwarteveen et al.,
2005). We use this analytical approach to examine the con-
tent of the three most important discourses mobilized to le-
gitimize the construction of hydropower complexes (be they
run-of-the-river or not) in the Eastern Himalayas: climate
change, clean energy, and economic development.
In Sect. 2, we outline the characteristics of the Himalayan
region and discuss the scale of planned hydropower devel-
opment there. This is followed by a presentation of debates
over climate change and hydropower as clean energy, and
their mobilization within this region in order to show what
kind of development is envisioned and what kinds of bene-
fits are expected to arise. By including the financial sector
and its emerging actors in the analysis, we demonstrate that
the benefits and risks are spatially and temporally highly dis-
connected, with potential impacts that cannot be simply pre-
dicted, controlled or mitigated.
4For details see http://www.icimod.org/?q=3598.
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2 Hydropower development in the (Eastern)
Himalayas
With roughly 43 000 MW of hydroelectric power already de-
veloped, recent figures for the region show plans to increase
this with more than 215 000 MW, although this does not in-
clude any of the Chinese projects (Dharmadhikary, 2008; IP-
PAN and CII, 2006). If these plans are realized, it would
make the region the highest dam-density area in the world
(Dharmadhikary, 2008; Vidal, 2013). A telling illustration of
the intensity of these development plans is provided in Fig. 1,
which shows the dams that are planned on the Teesta River
in Sikkim, North-East India.
In the coming decades, Nepal plans to construct
22 000 MW of hydropower infrastructure. This level of elec-
tricity production far exceeds national power requirements
even if the country’s significant and long-standing national
power deficiencies are redressed and future increases in
demand are considered implying that the bulk of projects
are designed to produce electricity exports to India. In In-
dia, equally impressive plans are being launched. In 2003,
the “50 000 MW initiative” was announced, preparing the
ground to build 162 dams. A significant number of these
dams are planned in Sikkim. In 2014, 11 of these were
installed, 10 were still under construction (primarily in
Sikkim), 50 had been prepared for approval, and seven have
been approved (Vagholikar and Das, 2010). The full develop-
ment of the expected hydropower expansion requires a sub-
stantial amount of capital. For Nepal, the most likely projects
to be achieved in the near future have been estimated to
cost roughly USD 4.2 billion, concentrated in 11 large dams.
For India, the 50 000 MW expansion is estimated at a cost
of USD 60 billion. These estimations do not include (sys-
temic) cost and schedule overruns (see for example Ansar et
al. (2014) for mega projects) or costs involved from installing
expensive transmission lines given the remote locations of
these projects (Dharmadhikary, 2008).
3 Clean energy and clean development mechanism
The increasing recognition of the need for alternative, non-
fossil energy sources in a context of increasing energy de-
mand has prompted the framing5 of hydropower as an al-
ternative, or clean and green, low carbon source of energy
(Imhof and Lanza, 2010; Käkönen and Kaisti, 2012; Kim,
2010). The International Hydropower Association (IHA)
thus argues that “the growing fleet of hydropower stations,
if developed sustainably, will help offset [greenhouse gas]
emissions as well as contribute to green growth” (Pyper,
2013). The World Bank’s IFC6 has begun projects that focus
5Framing is a discursive strategy of getting a particular message
across by linking or assigning a particular trait or perspective to a
concept so as to persuade the other.
6http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/
ff1b33804d9724098cecbd48b49f4568/IFC+Promotes+
on providing training and capacity building to key stakehold-
ers, including investors as a means to ensuring sustainable
and commercially viable hydropower, which ensures that the
environment is protected and that local people have access
to the water resources they depend on. In the words of the
Bank’s Vice President for Sustainable Development “[l]arge
hydropower facilities have become a key milestone for green
growth” (Grenier, 2012).
Yet, repackaging hydropower infrastructure as clean en-
ergy is confusing the resource with the instrument: water
is renewable, yet dams are not (McCully, 1996). It also
ignores widely available knowledge on greenhouse gases
(GHGs) emitted by reservoirs, not to speak of the less stud-
ied but substantial amount emitted during the process of con-
struction and subsequent land use changes (Fearnside, 2014;
Fletcher, 2010; Lima et al., 2008; IPCC, 20117, Mäkinen
and Khan, 2010; Pittock, 2010; Kim, 2010). According to
the WCD (2000), large dams’ reservoirs could contribute be-
tween 1 and 28 % of the global warming potential of GHG
emissions. In certain circumstances, gross GHG emissions
from large dams can be potentially higher that thermal alter-
natives in tropical and boreal regions (McCully, 2004; WCD,
2000; Yumnam, 2012). Since 2011, the International Hy-
dropower Association has recognized the problem and is un-
dertaking research with UNESCO-IHP on GHG emissions
and monitoring.
In line with the clean energy discourse, hydropower de-
velopment in low-income countries is eligible for top-up
funding through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
and can generate Certified Emission Reduction certificates
(CERs, or carbon credits) (ADB, 2007; Newell et al., 2011).
The CDM was established under the UNFCC Kyoto Pro-
tocol with ambitious expectations to reduce GHG emis-
sions, and became popular for hydropower development.
While in 2004 only 3 % of newly installed small hydropower
projects applied for the CDM, this grew to 45 % in 2007.
In that year, China for example, applied for CDM regis-
tration for almost all of its new hydropower plants. Both
India and China have applied for CDM for large- and
small-scale hydropower installations (Spalding-Fecher et al.,
2012), whereas the Nepalese government even instituted a
special task force to maximize access to CDM-related funds.
In 2012, 1000 hydropower projects were registered under the
CDM and 700 more were applying for registration. These
projects are primarily located in Brazil, China and India,
while CER purchasers are mainly in Japan, The Netherlands,
United Kingdom and Germany. Of the projects registered
under the CDM, most are located in the Himalayas (CDM
Sustainability+of+the+Hydropower+Sector+in+Lao+PDR.pdf?
MOD=AJPERES.
7In 2007, IPCC promoted the potential of hydropower to reduce
net GHG emissions as a mitigation instrument eligible under the
CDM. However, in the same chapter, they also discuss the emissions
from reservoirs, yet promote hydropower as having a net benefit
compared to other sources of energy.
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Watch, 2014; IHA, 2010; Erlewein and Nüsser, 2011). In
this way, the CDM becomes an enabler of hydropower fi-
nancing as promoted by the World Bank. To scale-up dam
financing and “maximize the strategic value of hydropower”,
the World Bank pushes for “measures to improve the envi-
ronment for private sector participation and getting access
to carbon credits” (World Bank, 2009, 2012, p. 59). Carbon
finance is thus sold as a key instrument to mitigate climate
change and provide indispensable funds through instruments
that leverage private capital. Nevertheless, “the combination
of the high share of the market applying for the CDM, the
favourable economics of hydropower in most countries and
the small impact of carbon revenue on profitability has led
to wide criticism of hydropower projects as not being addi-
tional” (Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012, p. 94).
In Northeast India, public and private companies (National
Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), Athena Power
Private Limited, Lanco Energy Private Limited, Teesta Urja
Limited Delhi, among others) seek carbon credits on the
pretext of their efforts to mitigate climate change. In this
way, carbon credits could be perceived to subsidize the hy-
dropower industry rather than mitigate climate change (Yum-
nam, 2012). It remains too early to identify how strong or
decisive a driver CDM is, and/or whether the IFC projects
and Equator Principles can foster sustainable and econom-
ically viable hydropower development. In India, the review
of the 2013 June flooding in the Central Himalayas by a fact-
finding committee identified an urgent need to improve the
environment governance of hydropower projects, and out-
lined that 23 of the 24 proposed hydropower projects (HEPs)
in the Central Himalayan region would have significant irre-
versible impacts on biodiversity values (SANDRP, 2014).
4 Climate change
Climate change is expected to affect profoundly the hy-
drogeological dynamics of the Himalayan region, having a
significant impact on geology, biodiversity and livelihoods
(Agrawala et al., 2003; Bawa et al., 2010; Gyawali, 2004;
Tse-ring et al., 2010). Over the last 30 years, average tem-
peratures have increased more than the global average and
precipitation patterns have become more erratic. In Nepal,
average annual precipitation and discharge of major basins
are decreasing (Tse-ring et al., 2010; WECS, 2011). Ris-
ing temperatures will likely precipitate glacier8 and snow
melt, thereby modifying river regimes and increasing risks
of flooding (Agrawala et al., 2003; Dixit, 2012; Sharma et
al., 2009; Shrestha et al., 2012). These physical shifts am-
plify other processes, producing a cascade of effects, in-
cluding reduced snowfall, variable precipitation, formation
and expansion of glacial lakes, cyclic run-off disruption, ac-
8However, some observations indicate that among the thousands
of glaciers in the Himalayas some are growing (Bawa et al., 2010).
celerated erosion (landslides, slope failures)9 and associated
risks (floods, drought)10. Unfortunately, insufficient data, es-
pecially for high-altitude areas, prevents a more precise un-
derstanding and prediction of the evolution of these phenom-
ena (Shrestha et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the tangible impacts
of climate change argued by scientists are largely confirmed
by local farmer and pastoralist communities who experience
the consequences (Bawa et al., 2010; WECS, 2011).
While hydropower is framed as a climate change mitiga-
tor, explicit attention to climate risks is hardly acknowledged
in national government and donor strategies with regard to
the impact of infrastructure construction (Agrawala et al.,
2003; Dharmadhikary, 2008; IR, 2014; Bawa et al., 2010). In
the case of Northeast India, revenue from hydropower is pre-
sented as facilitating social development programmes11. The
discourse driving hydropower here concerns development
and modernization, rather than sustainability or resilience to
climate change (IPPAN and CII, 2006; Dixit and Gyawali,
2010), although we suggest that climate change is mobilized
to enhance its promotion where convenient. A report com-
missioned by the OECD warns about the high projected im-
pacts of climate change on water resources and hydropower
production in the Himalayas, in terms of certainty, timing
and severity (Agrawala et al., 2003). Climate change is likely
to affect both the safety and productivity of hydraulic in-
frastructure in a number of ways (IPCC, 2014). On the one
hand, siltation and unpredictable water flows might impact
directly the expected power production, threatening the eco-
nomic viability of a dam. For instance, cases have been re-
ported of power turbines becoming dysfunctional after mas-
sive siltation in reservoir or run-of-the-river projects. On the
other hand, the security of the infrastructure itself is at risk.
The Himalayas is an active seismic region, characterized by
landslides, flash floods, and changing geomorphologies of
river and lake beds. Furthermore, the glacial lakes of the Hi-
malayas are expanding as they are fed by melting ice and
snow, with the risk of outburst floods. In sum, substantial
concerns question the suitability of widespread dam building
in a region that is highly vulnerable to both climatic changes
and seismic activity (Baruah, 2012; Shah, 2013; Totten et al.,
2010; WECS, 2011).
That hydropower development will be necessary in the Hi-
malayas, and that countries such as Nepal perceive it a wel-
come generator of external revenue, demands not only a criti-
cal and interdisciplinary analysis of the scale, location, tech-
nology and purpose of the installations but also concerted
9Being young mountains, the Himalayas have a very high rate
of erosion.
10In Nepal, floods are triggered by five main types of mechanism:
continuous rainfall and cloudburst, glacial lake outburst flood, land-
slide dam outburst flood, infrastructure failure and sheet flooding in
lowland plains (WECS, 2011).
11See Chandy et al. (2012) for details on how this is argued in
Sikkim.
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and inclusive decision-making around the priorities and dis-
tributional implications of generated benefits and costs. In
this analysis it has to be made clear what the composite of
drivers behind hydropower development are.
5 Financialization
Recent research shows that hydropower development has at-
tracted the attention of not only power hungry nations, but
also global and regional financial actors (Hildyard, 2012;
Merme et al., 2014). Large infrastructure projects that have
productive potential allow both the absorption of surplus
capital as well as the incorporation of a myriad of finan-
cial instruments. The IFIs previously involved in the hy-
dropower sector, such as multilateral and bilateral banks,
state-owned agencies or export credit agencies (ECAs), have
ceded ground to new regional and global commercial actors:
primarily investment banks, funds, and corporations who
provide less conditioned and more readily available capital
injections. The IFIs still facilitate the process as impact miti-
gators, while the new actors make use of cutting-edge finan-
cial instruments under private, and thus more obscure, con-
structions. Merme et al. (2014, p. 26) explain how neoliberal
policy reform facilitated this:
To stimulate large-scale infrastructure develop-
ment, such as large dams, the new power sector
reforms provided new financial avenues, constel-
lations for capital accumulation and new financial
instruments that also reduce risks for investors.
These included political risk guarantees, credit in-
surance, credit enhancement such as partial risk
guarantees, bond insurance and the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism.
As such, the financialization of the energy sector is a re-
sult of the relatively recent deregulation and liberalization
of power markets. To understand what financialization im-
plies, it is necessary to look at financial markets with some
hindsight. Over the past decades, the growth and size of in-
ternational financial markets has far exceeded the growth of
the global GDP based on active assets, increasingly so since
the last 2008 financial crisis. In 2013, the size of the deriva-
tives economy was about 10 times larger than the actual
real economy, accounting for USD 710 trillion12 compared to
USD 75 trillion13. A financial consultant explains in the New
York Times (2014)14:
12From http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1405.htm, consulted
8 August 2014.
13From http://data.worldbank.org/, consulted 8 August 2014.
14From http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/
derivatives-markets-growing-again-with-few-new-protections/
?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1., con-
sulted 8 August 2014.
A derivative, put simply, is a contract between
two parties whose value is determined by changes
in the value of an underlying asset. Those assets
could be bonds, equities, commodities or curren-
cies. The majority of contracts are traded over the
counter, where details about pricing, risk measure-
ment and collateral, if any, are not available to the
public (New York Times, 2014):
Even though the full implications of these processes are
still unclear, the impact of financialization on hydropower
development demands urgent attention because of the dom-
inance of the financial industry in the economy, the as-
cendance of shareholder power in the influence of corpo-
rate business strategies (March and Purcell, 2014), and be-
cause the private character of the investments inhibits public
scrutiny (Merme et al., 2014). Both Hildyard (2012) and La-
pavitsas (2013) show how financial gains are made without
the need to produce anything. In other words: the hydropower
installations may not need to be productive for them to be fi-
nancially attractive, which can explain the interest of private
financiers in hydropower development, specifically under the
risky and uncertain conditions of climate change. Lohman
and Hildyard (2014) explain this as the increasing commod-
ification of uncertainty through hedging mechanisms as a
means of estimating the cost of risks. Sanda et al. (2013) re-
vealed in a study of 12 Norway hydropower utilities that their
hedging policy strategies were a source of significant profit.
In other words, higher risks generate higher potential profits,
rather than benefits.
The Himalayas are currently also witnessing a much more
prominent role of private investors in hydropower develop-
ment (Dixit and Gyawali, 2010; Hildyard, 2012). The still
evolving new institutional landscape around hydropower de-
velopment is inhabited by private developer corporations,
private commercial banks, domestic capital markets, special-
purpose state corporations, and public financial institutions
such as the Power Finance Corporation (Choudhury, 2013).
Already in the early 1990s, the Indian power sector started
opening up to private sector participation. Several incentives
to attract private capital were developed (debt/equity ratio
raised to 4 : 1 and 100 % foreign equity participation permit-
ted, hydrological risks compensation, favourable tariff for-
mulation, survey of potential dam sites, environmental clear-
ance procedures, creation of power trading, creation of public
regional hydropower corporations, longer period for loan re-
payment from public bodies, and hydropower purchase obli-
gations). Despite such reforms, private participation did not
take off as expected due to a number of barriers: high risks,
no long-term debt financing, uncertain creditworthiness of
utilities that would purchase power, provision of free or sub-
sidized electricity, and front-end tariffs. The 2003 Electric-
ity Act (which instituted trading, open access, stand-alone
systems, exemption of a power generating company to ob-
tain a license, mandatory share for renewable and the devel-
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opment of the national power grid) and the 2008 Integrated
Energy Policy15 together with state-level initiatives, have fi-
nally succeeded in encouraging private financiers to invest in
hydropower, through IPP (independent power producer) and
PPP (public–private partnership) arrangements (ADB, 2007;
Choudhury, 2013).
In Sikkim, the government established a comprehensive
hydropower policy in 1998 to attract investments to the state.
Consequently, the Teesta dams were granted environmental
clearance in 1999, and in 2002, 26 companies were approved
to sign agreements with the Government of Sikkim to start
the projects (McDuie-Ra, 2011). Ten years later, Sikkim’s
rivers seem to have been carefully divided among power
companies (Yumnam, 2012). In addition, the state govern-
ment established the Sikkim Power Development Corpora-
tion Ltd (SPDCL) to facilitate a joint venture between pri-
vate developers and national bodies. Through contractual ar-
rangements, a share of the power produced is given freely
to the Sikkim state government (around 12 %), while private
developers are allowed to either sell the remaining power
generated directly to other states or through power trading
agencies. Nonetheless, the government has experienced dif-
ficulties in reaching financial closure of planned projects, as
financiers insist on investment safeguard mechanisms such as
purchase agreements or national financial guarantees (ADB,
2007).
Nepal has also introduced structural power reforms in or-
der to foster investment in hydropower (tariffs schemes, stor-
age plants and contracts) (Gyawali, 2013). The government
of India nominated the Power Trading Corporation (PTC) as
the nodal agency to deal with matters relating to power ex-
change with Nepal in July 2001. PTC is also the sole agency
from the Indian side for finalizing all commercial and techni-
cal arrangements and systems with the Nepal Electricity Au-
thority (NEA) and coordinating with associated Indian agen-
cies (ADB, 2007, p. 24). As India has comparatively more
developed capital markets than other South Asian countries,
power projects in Nepal driven by private sector actors take
advantage of the Indian capital markets in securing equity,
debt and other financial services (insurance and other risk
management, etc.) for their hydropower projects.
Underlying the above-mentioned processes are two factors
of concern. The first are the power asymmetries across bor-
ders, with Bhutan and Nepal being in a weaker a position
to negotiate than India or China. With regard to Nepal this
means that produced energy flows primarily to the Indian
market at low tariffs. The geopolitical tensions between In-
dia and China have led to a lack of cooperation between the
two in terms of sharing information or forming transbound-
ary agreements, although some research cooperation and col-
laborative monitoring of glacier melt do exist (Baruah, 2012;
Bawa et al., 2010; Dunghel and Pun, 2009; Pomeranz, 2009).
15http://www.indianenergysector.com/overview/
integrated-energy-policy-2008-of-india.
Some posit that these countries’ ambitions for regional power
results in a race to construct dams in certain transbound-
ary basins in the Eastern Himalayas (Pomeranz, 2009, Vi-
dal, 2013). The second factor of concern is the opaque and
problematic financial arrangements between private develop-
ers and local governments that include corrupt practices, ir-
regularities, and lack of transparency or accountability16. In
India, this is reported to have resulted in speedy approvals of
projects without adequate clearances, environmental impact
assessments or public consultations (Prasai and Surie, 2013).
6 Conclusions
The current expansion of hydropower projects in the East-
ern Himalayas is presented as fulfilling urgent energy needs
in ways that also mitigate the effects of climate change.
Hydropower may indeed be the only or best source of en-
ergy available for a substantive part of the Himalayas. Cer-
tainly for Nepal, hydropower development may be one of
few sources of badly needed external revenue. Rather than
discount hydropower altogether, this paper argues that such
a presentation carries a number of important contradictions.
First, hydropower development is promoted as an instrument
for climate change mitigation while construction and reser-
voirs produce potentially high GHG emissions. While hy-
dropower may be renewable, the waterscape is often irre-
versibly changed by the processes of generating hydropower.
Using clean development and climate change to legitimize
hydropower development dangerously obscures the many en-
vironmental and social impacts that hydropower develop-
ment will have. Second, the uncertainties implied by climate
variability, particularly in the Himalayan region, raise major
concerns about future projections of hydropower production
and/or flood control, and their associated risks. Third, while
the financial viability of hydropower may be quite satisfac-
tory or even highly profitable, viable hydropower production
is far from guaranteed: substantial amounts of hydro dol-
lars can be earned without much electricity being produced.
Fourth, producing power for growing urban centres and in-
dustries, as well as for new financial agents, at the expense of
mountain livelihoods and landscapes implies great uneven-
ness in the distribution of costs and benefits. If ecosystem
integrity is not safeguarded, it also brings in danger future
use of these resources. Fifth, hydropower development, oper-
ation, and maintenance demand new and sophisticated forms
of management and regulation given their spatial and tempo-
ral dimensions: to date far too little attention has been paid to
the governance arrangements needed to manage these infras-
tructure projects and their implications. This includes several
dimensions, such as aligning up- and downstream multiple
16For details on Sikkim see http://indiatogether.org/articles/
sikkim-s-2400-crore-hydro-power-scam-states and http://www.
internationalrivers.org/campaigns/teesta-river.
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uses and users of water, transboundary basin agreements, and
risk management.
The potential to mitigate climate change is presented as a
legitimate driver of the current phase of hydropower devel-
opment in the Eastern Himalayas. However, this discursive
framing conveniently overlooks the wider and worrying links
between climate change and new hydropower constructions.
Moreover, it provides a mechanism through which a much
broader set of financial and geopolitical drivers and inter-
ests are pursued, with few convincing benefits in terms of
development for the mountain communities in whose land-
scapes these new dams are installed. Greater awareness of the
intersections between hydropower development and climate
change is not simply necessary to assess the physical viabil-
ity and impacts of dams, but also fundamentally extends to
the fair distribution of the social and financial benefits and
costs among the stakeholders involved. To date, we contend,
far too much emphasis has been placed on the former, and
far too little on the latter.
In sum, our purpose in this paper is to analyse the rather
opportunistic framing of hydropower as clean, green or easy
energy, or as self-evident motor of development in the face
of generalized climate challenges. Instead we encourage a
discussion in which the political drivers, distributional as-
sumptions and consequences of the intersections between
hydropower development and climate change are taken se-
riously, with a localized understanding generated by a robust
and detailed analysis of the benefits and risks involved at
scale. In particular, detailed analysis of where and what kind
of hydropower would be useful or disastrous would take us
beyond opportunistic and ill-informed notions that situates
climate change as a “natural problem” affecting “us all” and
easy win–win solutions to mediating change.
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